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Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and George K. Karagiannidis, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We investigate the secrecy performance of dual-
hop amplify-and-forward (AF) multi-antenna relaying systems
over Rayleigh fading channels, by taking into account the direct
link between the source and destination. In order to exploit
the available direct link and the multiple antennas for secrecy
improvement, different linear processing schemes at the relay
and different diversity combining techniques at the destination
are proposed, namely, 1) Zero-forcing/Maximal ratio combining
(ZF/MRC), 2) ZF/Selection combining (ZF/SC), 3) Maximal ratio
transmission/MRC (MRT/MRC) and 4) MRT/Selection combin-
ing (MRT/SC). For all these schemes, we present new closed-form
approximations for the secrecy outage probability. Moreover, we
investigate a benchmark scheme, i.e., cooperative jamming/ZF
(CJ/ZF), where the secrecy outage probability is obtained in
exact closed-form. In addition, we present asymptotic secrecy
outage expressions for all the proposed schemes in the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, in order to characterize key
design parameters, such as secrecy diversity order and secrecy
array gain. The outcomes of this paper can be summarized as
follows: a) MRT/MRC and MRT/SC achieve a full diversity order
of M + 1, ZF/MRC and ZF/SC achieve a diversity order of
M , while CJ/ZF only achieves unit diversity order, where M
is the number of antennas at the relay. b) ZF/MRC (ZF/SC)
outperforms the corresponding MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) in the
low SNR regime, while becomes inferior to the corresponding
MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) in the high SNR. c) All of the proposed
schemes tend to outperform the CJ/ZF with moderate number of
antennas, and linear processing schemes with MRC attain better
performance than those with SC.
Index Terms—Relaying networks, amplify-and-forward, phys-
ical layer security, multiple antennas, secrecy performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission,wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to
eavesdropping. The traditional ways of combating eavesdrop-
ping is to employ cryptographic schemes in the upper layers,
which nevertheless has to deal with the problem of secret
key distribution and management, in addition to the high
complexity of data encryption and decryption processing [1].
Recently, the concept of physical layer security, first proposed
in Shannon’s pioneering work [2], has gained rekindled inter-
ests. In [3], the concept of wiretap channel was introduced,
and the secrecy rate of a degraded wiretap channel was
analyzed from the information-theoretic perspective. Since
then, physical layer security has been widely investigated
in various communication scenarios, for example, Gaussian
wiretap channel [4] and relay-eavesdropper channel [5].
Recently, multiple antenna techniques, which provide extra
spatial degrees of freedom, have been exploited to enhance
the secrecy performance of wireless networks [6]–[11]. For
example, in [6], the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with multiple antennas was analyzed, by using gener-
alized singular value decomposition and independent coding
across the resultant parallel channels. In [7], transmit antenna
selection (TAS) was proposed for secrecy enhancement for
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, with
different receiver combining schemes. In [8] and [9], the
impact of antenna correlation on the secrecy performance
of multi-antenna wiretap channels was quantified. Further-
more, in [10], the authors mainly investigated the secrecy
performance of the MIMO wiretap channel, by using TAS
with receive generalized selection combining, over Nakagami-
m fading channels. In [11], the ergodic secrecy sum-rate of
a multiuser downlink system was analyzed, by using the
regularized zero-forcing precoding based on imperfect channel
estimation. Later, the authors in [12] and [13] investigated the
secure transmission in multicell massive MIMO systems. In
addition, in [14] and [15], the physical layer security of multi-
antenna wiretap channels with wireless information and power
transfer was investigated, respectively.
On the other hand, cooperative relaying techniques, which
can improve the secrecy performance of wireless communica-
tions, have also received substantial interest [16]. In general,
the relay node can either act as a conventional coopera-
tive node to assist the transmission of the source or as a
jammer by sending the interference signal, to confuse the
eavesdroppers [17]–[19]. Specifically, in [20] and [21], the
2authors proposed a cooperative jamming scheme to improve
the security level against eavesdroppers. Later in [22]–[25],
different cooperative schemes, such as decode-and-forward
(DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF), were designed to enhance
the security of dual-hop relaying networks. In [26] and [27],
the authors investigated the secrecy performance of multiuser
relaying networks, respectively. Specifically, in [26], three
criteria to select the best relay and user pair were designed to
improve the secure transmission, while in [27], a cooperative
jamming was proposed to improve the security. Finally, a
joint cooperative beamforming, jamming and power allocation
scheme to enhance the security of AF relaying networks was
proposed in [28].
Although these prior works have significantly improved
the understanding of the secrecy performance of dual-hop
relaying networks, the key limitation is that in all of them,
the direct link between the transmitter and destination node
was neglected, which may result in an underestimation of the
secrecy performance. Only in a recent work [29], a single
antenna DF relaying network with the direct link between the
legitimate source and destination node was considered, where
it was shown that the direct link can be exploited to further
enhance the secrecy performance. Motivated by this, in this
paper, we consider a more general multi-antenna dual-hop AF
relaying system, taking into account the direct link between
the source and destination node.
In order to exploit the extra degrees of freedom, provided
by multiple antennas at the relay, we propose a heuristic two-
stage relay processing scheme to enhance the security of a
dual-hop relaying network. According to this scheme, the relay
first uses maximal ratio combining (MRC) to maximize the
signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the source-relay link, and then
forwards the transformed signal to destination with simple
linear processing methods, in an attempt to further improve
the quality of main channel. To this end, two popular linear
processing methods, i.e., 1) zero-forcing (ZF), and 2) maximal
ratio transmission (MRT), will be investigated. Furthermore,
since both the destination and eavesdropper receive two inde-
pendent versions of the source message, diversity combining
schemes can be applied. In this paper, we consider both MRC
and selection combining (SC) at the destination, while, for the
eavesdropper, we only consider the MRC scheme. Therefore,
depending on the linear processing schemes adopted at the
relay and destination, four secure transmission schemes will be
investigated, namely, 1) ZF/MRC scheme, 2) ZF/SC scheme,
3) MRT/MRC scheme, and 4) MRT/SC scheme. In addition, as
a benchmark, cooperative jamming with ZF scheme (CJ/ZF) is
also analyzed, where the role of relay node is to send jamming
signals to degrade the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
 For ZF/MRC and ZF/SC, we present novel closed-form
lower and upper bounds for the secrecy outage proba-
bility and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
respectively, as well as a simple high SNR secrecy outage
analysis. Furthermore, we show that ZF/MRC and ZF/SC
achieve the same diversity order of M , where M is the
number of antennas at the relay.
Transmitter
 
(Eve)
Destination
Relay
 
(Alice) (Bob)
Eavesdropper
Fig. 1. System model for the relaying scheme.
 For MRT/MRC and MRT/SC, closed-form approxima-
tions for the secrecy outage probability and the prob-
ability of non-zero secrecy capacity are provided, re-
spectively. In addition, we characterize the high SNR
secrecy outage behavior, and show that both MRT/MRC
and MRT/SC achieve a full diversity order of M + 1.
 For the CJ/ZF scheme, new exact closed-form expressions
for the secrecy outage probability and the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity are derived. Moreover, we
characterize the high SNR secrecy outage behavior of
the CJ/ZF scheme, which reveals that it achieves secrecy
diversity order of one.
 The analytical results suggest that the ZF/MRC
(MRT/MRC) scheme always achieves better performance
than that of the corresponding ZF/SC (MRT/SC) scheme.
In addition, the ZF/MRC (ZF/SC) scheme outperforms
the corresponding MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) scheme in the
low SNR regime, while in the high SNR regime, the
MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) scheme attains better secrecy
performance than the corresponding ZF/MRC (ZF/SC)
scheme.
 The results demonstrate that all the proposed schemes
tend to outperform the CJ/ZF scheme with moderate num-
ber of antennas, especially when the quality of eavesdrop-
per’s channel is bad. Moreover, increasing the number of
antennas at the relay provides marginal performance gains
for the CJ/ZF scheme, while it significantly enhances the
secrecy performance of the proposed diversity schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is introduced in Section II. Section III formulates the
problem and presents a set of new analytical expressions for
the key secrecy performance. In Section IV, we provide nu-
merical results and discussions. Finally, Section VI concludes
the paper and summarizes our findings.
Notations: We use bold lower case letters to denote vec-
tors and lower case letters to denote scalars, respectively.
The probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a random variable (RV) X are
denoted as fX () and FX (), respectively. The symbol kkF
denotes the Frobenius norm, y denotes the conjugate transpose
operator, E [] stands for the expectation operator, n! denotes
the factorial of integer n, and   (x) is the Gamma function.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a dual-hop multiple antenna AF relaying
network as illustrated in Fig. 1, where both Alice (A), Bob
(B), and Eve (E) are equipped with a single antenna, while
the relay (R) is equipped with M antennas. We consider
the realistic scenario where a direct link exists between A
and B. Throughout this paper, the following assumptions are
adopted: 1) A, R and B have perfect knowledge of the main
channel fading information and E also has perfect knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s channel fading information1, 2) The
main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are assumed to be
quasi-static block fading channel with independent but non-
identically distributed Rayleigh fading, such that the channel
coefficients remain unchanged during the coherence time of
the channel, 3) As in [29], [32], [33], we assume that the CSI
of R! E link is available at R.
We assume a half-duplex relaying operation, as such, the en-
tire communication between A and B consists of two phases.
During the first phase, A encodes the block information w
into the codeword x = [x (1) ;    ; x (i) ;    ; x (n)] with
1
n
Pn
i=1 E
jx (i)j2  Ps, using the capacity achieving code-
book for the wiretap channel. The received signals at R, B,
and E at time i are given, respectively, by
yR (i) =
p
PshARx (i) + nR (1)
yB;1 (i) =
p
PshABx (i) + nB;1 (2)
yE;1 (i) =
p
PshAEx (i) + nE;1; (3)
where Ps is the transmit power at A, hAR is an M  1
channel vector for the A ! R link with entries following
identical and independently distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading
with parameter 1, hAB and hAE denote the Rayleigh channel
coefficients for the A! B and A! E links with parameters
0 and 4, respectively, nR is the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at R with E

nRn
y
R

= 2I, nB;1 and nE;1
denote the zero-mean AWGN at B and E with variance 2,
respectively. Thus, the instantaneous SNRs of A ! B and
A! E links are given, respectively, by
AB =
Ps
2
jhABj2 (4)
and
AE =
Ps
2
jhAEj2: (5)
In the second phase2, R retransmits a transformed version
of yR (i) to B, and the signal at B is given by
yB;2 (i) = h
y
RBWyR (i) + nB;2; (6)
1In practice, the channel state information (CSI) of the main link can
be obtained at A, R and B by the classic channel training, estimation, and
feedback mechanisms as in [30], [31]. Similarly, the CSI of eavesdropper’s
link can also be achieved at Eve by traditional channel estimations.
2To capture the effect of linear processing schemes on the secrecy per-
formance, in this paper, we assume that Alice remains silent in the second
phase. However, it is worth mentioning that, with proper design, the secrecy
performance could be further improved if Alice acts as a jammer in the second
phase as shown in [18], [19].
where hRB is anM1 channel vector for the R! B link, and
its entries follow i.i.d. Rayleigh fading with parameter 2, nB;2
is the AWGN with variance 2, and W denotes the transfor-
mation matrix at R node with E
kWyR (i)k2F  = Pr, where
Pr denotes the transmit power constraint at relay. Hence,
substituting (1) into (6) and performing some mathematical
manipulations, the instantaneous SNR of A! R! B link is
given by
ARB =
Ps
2
hyRBWhAR2
1 +
hyRBW2
F
: (7)
On the other hand, the received signal at E during the second
phase can be expressed as
yE;2 (i) = h
y
REWyR (i) + nE;2; (8)
where hRE is an M  1 channel vector for the R ! E link,
and its entries follow i.i.d. Rayleigh fading with parameter
3, and nE;2 is the AWGN with variance 2. Similarly, the
instantaneous SNR of A! R! E link can be derived as
ARE =
Ps
2
hyREWhAR2
1 +
hyREW2
F
: (9)
Since both B and E have access to two independent copies
of the source signal, several diversity combining schemes can
be applied to strengthen the signal detection. Without loss of
generality, we assume that two popular diversity combining
schemes, i.e., MRC and SC, are adopted at B, while Eve
always adopts MRC scheme3. Therefore, according to (4) and
(7), the instantaneous SNRs of the main channel under MRC
and SC schemes are given by
BMRC = AB + ARB (10)
and
BSC = max (AB; ARB) : (11)
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel under MRC scheme is represented as
EMRC = AE + ARE: (12)
Now, according to [29], [32], [33], the achievable secrecy
capacity of the relaying wiretap channels is defined as
CS

=
1
2
[log2 (1 + Bi)  log (1 + EMRC)]+; (13)
where i 2 fMRC;SCg, the factor 1/2 accounts for the fact
that the total communication consists of two time slots, and
[x]
+
= max (x; 0) =

x; x  0
0; x < 0
(14)
Note that, due to the non-convex nature of the problem, the
optimal transform matrixW, which maximizes the achievable
secrecy capacity of relaying wiretap channels, does not seem
to be analytically tractable. To tackle with this problem, we
3Here, we only assume that the MRC scheme is adopted at Eve. However,
for the case of SC, similar analysis can be applied.
4propose a heuristic two-stage relay processing strategy, i.e.,
the relay first uses the MRC scheme to maximize the SNR
of the A ! R link, and then delivers the transformed signal
to B with linear processing methods to enhance the quality
of the main channel. Hence, the heuristic relay precoder W
is a rank-one matrix, i.e., W = w2
hyAR
khARkF , where  is the
power constraint factor, h
y
AR
khARkF is utilized for matching the
A ! R link, and w2 is an M  1 linear processing vector,
which depends on the linear processing scheme employed by
the relay. Specifically, here we consider two different linear
processing schemes, namely, the ZF scheme and the MRT
scheme as detailed below.
A. Zero Forcing (ZF)
The objective of ZF scheme is to maximize the received
SNR at B, while avoiding the leakage of confidential infor-
mation to E. According to the ZF principle, the optimal w2
is the solution of the following optimization problem:
max
w2
hyRBw2
s:t:
hyREw2 = 0; & kw2kF = 1: (15)
By using projection matrix theory [34], the weight vector w2
is given by
w2 =
?hRB
k?hRBkF
; (16)
where ? =
 
I  hRE
 
hyREhRE
 1
hyRE

is the projection
idempotent matrix with rank M   1. To satisfy the transmit
power constraint at relay with AF protocol and considering
the variable gain relaying scheme, the constant 2 is given by
2 =
Pr
hyARhARPs + 2
: (17)
Thus, the instantaneous SNRs of the main channel with MRC
and SC schemes can be expressed as
ZFBMRC = AB + 
ZF
ARB (18)
and
ZFBSC = max
 
AB; 
ZF
ARB

; (19)
where
ZFARB =
Ps
2 khARk2F Pr2
?hRB2F
Ps
2 khARk2F + Pr2 k?hRBk
2
F + 1
: (20)
As a result, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel reduces to
ZFEMRC = AE: (21)
B. Maximal ratio transmission (MRT)
According to MRT scheme, w2 is set to match the second
hop of the main channel, i.e., w2 =
hyRB
khRBkF . Therefore, the
instantaneous SNRs of the main channel with MRC and SC
schemes are expressed respectively as
MRTBMRC = AB + 
MRT
ARB (22)
and
MRTBSC = max
 
AB; 
MRT
ARB

; (23)
where
MRTARB =
Ps
2 khARk2F Pr2 khRBk2F
Ps
2 khARk2F + Pr2 khRBk2F + 1
: (24)
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel with MRC scheme is given by
MRTEMRC = AE + 
MRT
ARE ; (25)
where
MRTARE =
Ps
2 khARk2F Pr2
jhyRBhREj
khRBk2F
Ps
2 khARk2F + Pr2
jhyRBhREj
khRBk2F
+ 1
: (26)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy performance
of dual-hop AF multi-antenna relaying systems in terms of
secrecy outage probability and probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity. The derived results will enable us to examine the
benefits of the proposed schemes.
A. Preliminaries
We start by presenting the probability density function
(PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the SNRs
of the main and the eavesdropper’s channels, which will
facilitate the ensuing secrecy analysis.
1) ZF/MRC: Although the statistics of AB and ZFARB
are known [35], deriving the exact distribution of ZFBMRC is
intractable. Hence, according to [36]–[38], we first seek the
tight upper bound on ZFARB, i.e., 
ZF
ARB  min (1; 2z), where
1 =
Ps
2 khARk2F and 2z = Pr2
?hRB2F . Thus, we have
ZFBMRC  ZFUBMRC = AB +min (1; 2z) : (27)
Next, we present the CDF of ZFUBMRC in the following lemma
4.
4Let us remark that the CDF of ZFUBMRC is derived with the assumption
of 2 6= 0 in Lemma 1. Due to the space limitation, we neglect the detail
analysis of the special case 2 = 0, however, which can be easily obtained
in a similar manner as in the case of 2 6= 0.
5Lemma 1. The CDF of ZFUBMRC is given by
FZFUBMRC
(x) =
1
M1   (M)
M 2X
k=0
  (k)
k!k2 
k
2

"
1  e  x0   1
0
k 1X
m=0
(m+ 1; 1x)
m! m2 
m+1
1
#
+
1
M 12   (M   1)
M 1X
k=0
  (k)
k!k2 
k
1

"
1  e  x0   1
0
k 1X
m=0
(m+ 1; 1x)
m! m2 
m+1
1
#
; (28)
where 1 = 11 +
1
2
, 2 = 11 +
1
2
  10 , k = M + k,
k = M + k   1, 0 = E [AB], 1 = E [1], 2 = E [2z],
and (; ) is the lower incomplete Gamma function [39, Eq.
(8.350.1)].
Proof: See Appendix A.
2) ZF/SC: For the ZF/SC scheme, the exact distribution
of ZFBSC can actually be obtained. However, to simplify the
analysis, we also resort to the upper bound approach, i.e.,
ZFBSC  ZFUBSC = max (AB;min (1; 2z)) : (29)
As such, we have the following key lemma:
Lemma 2. The CDF of ZFUBSC can be expressed as
FZFUBSC
(x) =
1
M1   (M)

1  e  x0
M 2X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
2
+
1
M 12   (M   1)

1  e  x0
M 1X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
1
: (30)
Proof: Due to the independence of AB, 1 and 2z , the
CDF of ZFUBSC can be derived as
FZFUBSC
(x) = FAB (x)FZ (x) ; (31)
where Z = min (1; 2z). Then, substituting the CDFs of
AB and Z (refer to (69) in Appendix A) into (31) yields the
desired result.
3) MRT/MRC: Similarly, MRTBMRC and 
MRT
EMRC
can be upper
bounded by
MRTBMRC  MRTUBMRC = AB +min (1; 2m) (32)
and
MRTEMRC  MRTUEMRC = AE +min (1; 3) ; (33)
where 2m = Pr2 khRBk2F and 3 = Pr2
jhyRBhREj2
khRBk2F
.
Now, we present the CDF of MRTUBMRC and the PDF of 
MRTU
EMRC
in the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. The CDF of MRTUBMRC is given by
FMRTUBMRC
(x) =
1
M1   (M)
M 1X
k=0
  (k)
k!k2 
k
2

"
1  e  x0   1
0
k 1X
m=0
m2 (m+ 1; 1x)
m!m+11
#
+
1
M2   (M)
M 1X
k=0
  (k)
k!k2 
k
1

"
1  e  x0   1
0
k 1X
m=0
m2 (m+ 1; 1x)
m!m+11
#
: (34)
Proof: Noticing that 2m follows the Chi-square distribu-
tion with 2M degrees of freedom, the desired CDF of MRTUBMRC
can be obtained by following similar procedure as in the proof
of Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. The PDF of MRTUEMRC can be expressed as
fMRTUEMRC
(x) =
e 
x
4
4
"
(M;4x)
M1   (M)
M
4
+
M 1X
k=0
(k; 4x)
k!k4 
k
13
#
;
(35)
where k = k + 1, 4 = 11 +
1
3
  14 , 3 = E [3], and
4 = E [AE].
Proof: Since 3 follows the exponential distribution [38],
thus, by following the similar analysis as in Lemma 1, the
desired expression can be easily obtained after some mathe-
matical manipulations5.
4) MRT/SC: Similarly, MRTBSC can be upper bounded by
MRTBSC  MRTUBSC = max (AB;min (1; 2m)) : (36)
As such, we have the following result.
Lemma 5. The CDF of MRTUBSC can be expressed as
FMRTUBSC
(x) =
1
M1   (M)

1  e  x0
M 1X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
2
+
1
M2   (M)

1  e  x0
M 1X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
1
: (37)
Proof: Similarly, as in the proof of Lemma 2, the above
result can be easily obtained after some simple mathematical
manipulations.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability
of the achievable secrecy capacity, CS, being lower than a
predetermined secrecy rate, Rs. Mathematically, it can be
represented as [1]
Pout (Rs) = Pr (CS < Rs)
=
Z 1
0
FBi
 
22Rs (1 + x)  1 fEMRC (x) dx: (38)
5In Lemma 4, we assume 4 6= 0 to derive the PDF of MRTUEMRC . The
special case 4 = 0 is not considered in this paper, however, the PDF of
which can be easily achieved by following similar steps of 4 6= 0.
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In the following, we present a detailed analysis of the secrecy
outage probability for the proposed schemes.
1) ZF/MRC: The secrecy outage probability of dual-hop
AF relaying systems with the ZF/MRC scheme is lower
bounded by (39) at the top of the page.
Proof: Using the following series representation of the
incomplete Gamma function
(n; x) =   (n)
 
1  e x
n 1X
m=0
xm
m!
!
; (40)
and noticing that ZFEMRC is an exponential RV, the lower bound
of the secrecy outage probability for the ZF/MRC scheme can
be obtained by substituting (28) into (38) and with the help
of [39, Eq. (3.351.3)].
While Eq. (39) provides an efficient way to evaluate the
secrecy outage performance of dual-hop AF relaying systems
with the ZF/MRC scheme, it cannot provide additional in-
sights into the impact of system parameters on the network
performance. Motivated by this, we turn our attention to
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in the high SNR
regime. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 !1,
2 = 1, and 0 = 1.
Corollary 1. In the high SNR regime, the secrecy outage
probability of dual-hop AF relaying systems with the ZF/MRC
scheme is given by
P1out;ZF=MRC (Rs) =
 
	ZF=MRC1
 ZF=MRC ; (41)
where the secrecy coding gain is given by
	ZF=MRC =
"
MX
n=0

M
n
 
22Rs   1M n 22Rs4nn!
M 1  (M + 1)
#  1M
;
(42)
and the secrecy diversity gain is ZF=MRC =M .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark: For the ZF/MRC scheme, the achievable secrecy
diversity order of dual-hop AF relaying systems isM , which is
independent of the parameters of the eavesdropper’s channel.
However, the parameters of the eavesdropper’s channel affect
the secrecy outage performance of dual-hop AF relaying
systems through the secrecy coding gain 	ZF=MRC.
2) ZF/SC: Following the same steps as in the ZF/MRC
scheme, the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop AF relay-
ing systems with the ZF/SC scheme is lower bounded by (43),
where 5 = 11 +
1
2
+ 10
.
Next, we turn our attention to the asymptotic outage prob-
ability P1out;ZF=SC (Rs), and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. In the high SNR regime, the secrecy outage
probability of dual-hop AF relaying systems with the ZF/SC
scheme can be expressed as
P1out;ZF=SC (Rs) =
 
	ZF=SC1
 ZF=SC ; (44)
where the secrecy coding gain is
	ZF=SC =
"
MX
n=0

M
n
 
22Rs   1M n 22Rs4nn!
M 1  (M)
#  1M
;
(45)
and the secrecy diversity gain is ZF=SC =M .
Proof: Following similar procedures as in Appendix B,
the asymptotic CDF of ZFBSC is given by
FZFBSC
(x) 

1
1
M
xM
M 1 (M   1)! : (46)
Substituting (46) into (38), and utilizing the equation [39, Eq.
(3.351.3)], the desired result can be obtained.
Now, comparing with the asymptotic results of the ZF/MRC
and ZF/SC schemes, we have the following remark:
Remark: The ZF/MRC and ZF/SC schemes achieve the
same secrecy diversity order of M , which is independent of
the eavesdropper’s channel. However, the ZF/MRC scheme
outperforms the ZF/SC scheme by achieving a higher coding
gain, i.e.,
	ZF=MRC
	ZF=SC
=M
1
M ; (47)
which suggests that to achieve the same secrecy outage prob-
ability, the required transmit power of the ZF/MRC scheme is
1
M 10 log (M) dB less.
3) MRT/MRC: The secrecy outage probability of dual-hop
AF relaying systems with the MRT/MRC scheme can be
approximated as (48), where v =M + v and 3 = 11 +
1
3
.
Proof: By inserting (34) and (35) into (38), and utilizing
[39, Eq. (8.352.1)] and [39, Eq. (3.351.3)], the desired result
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(43)
can be obtained after some simple mathematical manipula-
tions.
To achieve more insights, we now proceed to find the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the MRT/MRC
scheme in the high SNR regime.
Corollary 3. In the high SNR regime, the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability of dual-hop AF relaying systems with the
MRT/MRC scheme is expressed as
P1out;MRT=MRC (Rs) =
 
	MRT=MRC1
 MRT=MRC ; (49)
where the secrecy coding gain is given as (50), and the secrecy
diversity gain is MRT=MRC =M + 1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark: The MRT/MRC scheme achieves a secrecy di-
versity order of M + 1, which is higher than that of the
ZF/MRC scheme. However, it is worth pointing out that
secrecy diversity order is an asymptotic performance measure,
a higher diversity order does not necessarily implies that the
MRT/MRC scheme outperforms the ZF/MRC scheme in the
entire SNR range of interest. In fact, it depends on both the
SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel.
4) MRT/SC: Following similar analysis as in the ZF/SC
scheme, the closed-form approximation of the secrecy outage
probability under the MRT/SC scheme can be expressed as
(51) at the top of the next page.
Proof: By inserting (35) and (37) into (38), and utilizing
[39, Eq. (8.352.1)] and [39, Eq. (3.351.3)], the final result can
be derived after some simple mathematical manipulations.
Next, we evaluate the asymptotic outage probability for the
MRT/SC scheme.
Corollary 4. In the high SNR regime, the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability of dual-hop AF relaying systems with the
MRT/SC scheme is given by
P1out;MRT=SC (Rs) =
 
	MRT=SC1
 MRT=SC ; (52)
where the secrecy coding gain is expressed as (53), and the
secrecy diversity gain is MRT=SC =M + 1.
Proof: From (73) and (76), the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability for the MRT/SC scheme is given by
FMRTBSC
(x) 

1
1
M+1
xM+1
M !

1 +
1
M

: (54)
By substituting (54) and (79) into (38), and with the help of
[39, Eq. (3.351.3)], the desired result can be obtained.
Now, according to Corollary 3 and Corollary 4, we proceed
to the following remark.
Remark: The MRT/MRC scheme attains better secrecy
outage performance than the MRT/SC scheme, and the perfor-
mance gap between these two schemes can be characterized
as a simple ratio of secrecy coding gain, i.e.,
	MRT=MRC
	MRT=SC
= (M + 1)
1
M+1 ; (55)
which suggests that for the same secrecy outage probability,
the MRT/MRC scheme outperforms the MRT/SC scheme by
an SNR gap of 1M+110 log (M + 1) dB less.
C. Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity
In this subsection, we check the condition for the existence
of non-zero secrecy capacity. According to (13), the probabil-
ity of non-zero secrecy capacity is formulated as
Pr (CS > 0) = Pr (Bi > EMRC) = 1  Pout (0) : (56)
Hence, by setting Rs = 0 into the expressions of (39), (43),
(48), and (51), closed-form approximation of the probability
of positive secrecy for dual-hop AF relaying systems with
each scheme can be easily evaluated after some mathematical
manipulations.
D. CJ/ZF Scheme
Cooperative jamming has been demonstrated as a promising
solution to improve the security of wireless communication
networks [41]. As a benchmark scheme, we consider the
scenario where the relay node R acts as a pure jammer
as illustrated in Fig. 2. As such, the relay tries its best to
degrade the quality of the eavesdropper’s signal while at the
same time avoiding interference at B. Therefore, the optimum
beamforming vector w3 can be obtained by
max
w3
hyREw3
s:t:
hyRBw3 = 0; & kw3kF = 1: (57)
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Now, according to [42, Proposition 1], the desired result is
given by
w3 =
?hRE
k?hREkF
; (58)
where ? =
 
I  hRB
 
hyRBhRB
 1
hyRB

. Hence, the instan-
taneous SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel are respectively expressed as
BCJ =
Ps
2
jhABj2 (59)
and
ECJ =
Ps
2 jhAEj2
Pr
2 k?hREk
2
F + 1
: (60)
Now, we proceed to investigate the secrecy performance for
the CJ/ZF scheme. To start with, we give the PDF of ECJ in
the following lemma.
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Fig. 2. System model for the cooperative jamming scheme.
Lemma 6. The PDF of ECJ is given by
fECJ (x) =
1
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e 
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4

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
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x
4
 1
+ 1
#
: (61)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Armed with Lemma 6, a detailed analysis of the secrecy
performance for the CJ/ZF scheme is provided in the following
section.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: From (59), we have
FBCJ (x) = 1  e
  x0 : (62)
Then, substituting (62) and (61) into (38), and performing
some simple mathematical manipulations, the secrecy outage
probability for the CJ/ZF scheme can be easily derived as
follows:
Pout;CJ (Rs) = 1  e 
2Rs 1
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3
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+
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3
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4
03

; (63)
where 	(; ; z) is the confluent hypergeometric function of
the second kind [39, Eq. (9.211.4)].
To achieve more insights, the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability for the CJ/ZF scheme can be easily derived as
P1out;CJ (Rs) =
1
0

2Rs (M   1) 4
3
	

2; 3 M ; 1
3

+
 
2Rs   1+ 2Rs 4
23
	

2; 4 M ; 1
3

: (64)
Remark: From (64), we find that the CJ/ZF scheme only
achieves secrecy diversity order of one, which is independent
of the number of antennas at the jammer.
2) Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity: By substitut-
ing Rs = 0 into (63), the exact closed-form expression of the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity for the CJ/ZF scheme
is given by
Pnon;CJ = 1  1
3
	

1; 3 M ; 1
3
+
4
03

  (M   1)	

1; 2 M ; 1
3
+
4
03

: (65)
Please note, the CJ/ZF is adopted as a conventional scheme
for comparison, however, the secrecy performance analysis of
the CJ/ZF scheme for secure communications is also a part of
the contribution of this work.
E. Comparison of the Proposed Schemes
We now provide a comparison between the four different
schemes studied and the benchmark scheme. In the previous
analysis, the CSI requirement to perform relay precoding or
jamming was not explicitly revealed. In practice, the acqui-
sition of CSI involves additional feedback overhead, which
must be considered in the design of wireless systems. On
the other hand, if a large amount of CSI is available at the
transmitting node, more sophisticated transmission schemes
could be designed to improve the transmission efficiency and
to achieve a better secrecy performance. Hence, in order to
make a fair comparison among different schemes, the CSI
requirement of each scheme must be characterized. Table
I gives a comparison of the ZF/MRC, ZF/SC, MRT/MRC,
MRT/SC and CJ/ZF schemes in terms of CSI requirement at
relay, antenna number M requirement, diversity order, and
impact of antenna number M on diversity order and coding
gain.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, representative numerical results are pro-
vided to verify our analysis in the previous sections. Unless
otherwise specified, the following set of parameters is used:
0 = 0:41, 2 = 1:21, Rs = 2, 3 = 10dB, and
4 = 10dB. In addition, to make a fair comparison, we assume
that the transmit power of the CJ/ZF scheme at Alice is half of
the sum power of the relay and Alice in the proposed schemes.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy outage probability of the
dual-hop AF relaying system with the ZF/MRC and ZF/SC
schemes for different M . As shown in the figure, we can
see that the analytical results of the ZF/MRC and ZF/SC
schemes from (39) and (43) remain sufficiently tight across
the entire SNR range of interest, which demonstrates the
usefulness of the analytical expressions. Moreover, we observe
that increasing M can significantly reduce the secrecy outage
probability of the considered system for both schemes. This
is intuitive since increasing M provides additional secrecy
diversity, as manifested through the asymptotic curves. An-
other intuitive observation is that the ZF/MRC outperforms
the ZF/SC scheme, which is consistent with the conventional
relay networks with no secrecy constraint.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability of the multi-
antenna relaying-eavesdropper channel with the MRT/MRC
and MRT/SC schemes for different M . It is observed that,
for the two proposed schemes, the analytical approximations
given in (48) and (51) are sufficiently accurate, and become
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability of the ZF/MRC and ZF/SC relaying
systems with different relay antenna number M .
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability of the MRT/MRC and MRT/SC relaying
systems with different relay antenna number M .
almost exact in the high SNR regime. Furthermore, we can see
that the MRT/MRC scheme always attains better performance
than the MRT/SC scheme, and all the slopes of the asymptotes
keep parallel for eachM , which indicates that the two schemes
achieve the same secrecy diversity order.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability of the ZF/MRC, ZF/SC, MRT/MRC and
MRT/SC schemes with M = 3, different 3, and different 4.
Fig. 5 investigates the impact of the quality of the eaves-
dropper’s channel on the secrecy outage probability of the
dual-hop AF relaying system with the proposed four schemes.
As expected, the secrecy outage performance of all the pro-
posed schemes improves when the quality of eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded, i.e., small 3 or 4. As mentioned
earlier, higher secrecy diversity order of MRT schemes do not
necessarily imply superior outage performance in the finite
SNR regime. As shown in the figure, the ZF/MRC (ZF/SC)
scheme outperforms the MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) scheme at the
low SNR regime, while the opposite holds in the high SNR
regime. The reason is that the ZF scheme can completely avoid
information leakage to E in the second phase, as such, E has
only access to a single copy of the source signal. Hence, the
achievable rate of the eavesdropper’s channel is reduced. On
the other hand, compared to the MRT scheme, the use of ZF
scheme also degrades the capacity of the main channel. In
the low SNR regime, the reduction of the wiretap channel
rate tends to outweigh the reduction of the main channel
rate. Therefore, ZF/MRC is better than MRT/MRC in the low
SNR regime. In addition, when the quality of eavesdropper’s
channel becomes good, i.e., large 3 or 4, the difference gap
between the ZF/MRC scheme and the MRT/MRC scheme is
reduced, and a similar phenomenon is observed between the
ZF/SC scheme and the MRT/SC scheme.
Fig. 6 examines the secrecy outage probability of the CJ/ZF
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE ZF/MRC, ZF/SC, MRT/MRC, MRT/SC AND CJ/ZF SCHEMES
ZF/MRC ZF/SC MRT/MRC MRT/SC CJ/ZF
CSI requirement at Relay hAR, hRB, and
hRE
hAR, hRB, and
hRE
hAR and hRB hAR and hRB hRB and hRE
Antenna number M re-
quirement
M > 1 M > 1 None None M > 1
Diversity order M M M + 1 M + 1 1
Impact of antenna number
M
M provides both
diversity order and
coding gain.
M provides both
diversity order and
coding gain.
M provides both
diversity order and
coding gain.
M provides both
diversity order and
coding gain.
M provides coding
gain, not diversity
order.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability of the CJ/ZF scheme with different relay
antenna number M and different 4.
scheme for different M and different 4. As can be readily
observed, the analytical results are in exact agreement with
the Monte Carlo simulations, while the high SNR curves work
quite well even at moderate SNRs. Moreover, different from
the other schemes, we can see that only diversity order of one
is achieved for the CJ/ZF scheme regardless of the number
of antennas M . However, increasing M does improve the
secrecy outage performance of the system by offering extra
secrecy coding gain. In addition, we find that the quality of the
eavesdropper’s channel has a negative impact on the secrecy
performance of the CJ/ZF scheme.
Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of the number of antennas at
the relay on the secrecy outage performance of the proposed
schemes and the CJ/ZF scheme with different 4. It is noted
that the gain of the proposed schemes relative to the CJ/ZF
scheme increases with the number of antennas. This can
be explained by the fact that the secrecy diversity order
achieved by the proposed schemes increases with the number
of antennas, while the secrecy diversity order of the CJ/ZF
scheme is irrelevant to the number of antennas. It is also worth
noting that the CJ/ZF may outperform the proposed schemes
in certain regime, i.e., when the antenna number is small,
especially when the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel is
relatively good, which needs to be taken into consideration for
practical system design.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy outage
performance of dual-hop AF relaying systems over Rayleigh
fading channels. To exploit the available direct link for secrecy
enhancement, we have proposed two linear precoding schemes
with different receiving diversity combining at destination.
Specifically, approximate closed-form expressions for the se-
crecy outage probability of all the proposed schemes were
derived, based on which the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity was also evaluated. Moreover, simple and informative
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Fig. 7. Secrecy Outage comparison of the proposed schemes and the CJ/ZF
scheme with 1 = 20dB, 3 = 5dB, different 4.
high SNR secrecy outage approximations were presented,
which enable us to gain further insights into the impact of key
parameters on the secrecy performance. In addition, to show
the advantages of the proposed schemes, the benchmark CJ/ZF
scheme was also analyzed. Our findings suggest that both
the MRT/MRC and MRT/SC schemes achieve a full secrecy
diversity order of M + 1, while the ZF/MRC and ZF/SC
schemes achieve a secrecy diversity order of M . Moreover,
the ZF/MRC (ZF/SC) scheme outperforms the corresponding
MRT/MRC (MRT/SC) scheme in the low SNR regime, while
the opposite holds in the high SNR regime. Finally, we have
shown that, the proposed schemes significantly perform better
secrecy performance than the CJ/ZF scheme especially when
the quality of eavesdropper’s channel is bad.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Without loss of generality, we first define Z =
min (1; 2z). Then, using the fact that 1 and 2 are inde-
pendent random variables, we have
FZ (x) = F1 (x) + F2z (x)  F1 (x)F2z (x) : (66)
Noticing that 1 is a chi squared RV with 2M degrees of
freedom (d.o.f.), its CDF is given by
F1 (x) = 1  e 
x
1
M 1X
k=0
1
k!

x
1
k
: (67)
On the other hand, according to [42], the 2z is also a chi
squared RV with 2 (M   1) d.o.f. with CDF given by
F2z (x) = 1  e 
x
2
M 2X
k=0
1
k!

x
2
k
: (68)
Then, substituting (67) and (68) into (66) and performing
some simple mathematical manipulations, the CDF of Z can
12
be derived as
FZ (x) =
1
M1   (M)
M 2X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
2
+
1
M 12   (M   1)
M 1X
k=0
(k; 1x)
k!k1 
k
1
: (69)
Taking the derivative of (69) with respect to x, the PDF of
Z is derived as
fZ (x) =
1
M1
xM 1e 
x
1
  (M   1)   (M) 

M   1; x
2

+
1
M 12
xM 2e 
x
2
  (M   1)   (M) 

M;
x
1

; (70)
where   (a; b) is the incomplete Gamma function [39, Eq.
(8.350.2)].
Due to the fact that AB is an exponential RV, then accord-
ing to (27), the Laplace transform of the PDF of ZFUBMRC can
be represented as
L
n
fZFUBMRC
(x)
o
=
LffZ (x)g
s+ 10

0
: (71)
In order to compute the inverse Laplace transform of (71), we
first utilize the formula [43, Eq. (1.1.1.13)]. Then, with the
help of [39, Eq. (3.351.1)], the PDF of ZFUBMRC can be derived
as
fZFUBMRC
(x) =
1
0
M
1   (M)
e 
x
0
M 2X
k=0
(k; 2x)
k!k2 
k
2
+
1
0
M 1
2   (M   1)
e 
x
0
M 1X
k=0
(k; 2x)
k!k2 
k
1
: (72)
To obtain the CDF of ZFUBMRC , we can directly integrate (72)
by expanding (; ) according to [39, Eq. (8.352.1)].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
In the high SNR regime, we assume that 1 ! 1, 2 =
1, and 0 = 1. The asymptotic CDF of AB can be
expressed as
FAB (x) 
x
1
: (73)
Similarly, in the high SNR regime, the CDF of Z can be
approximated as
FZ (x) 
1
(M   1)!

x
1
M 1
: (74)
Note that ZFBMRC  AB + Z, hence, by invoking [44,
Propositions 4 and 5], the asymptotic CDF of ZFBMRC can be
expressed as
FZFBMRC
(x)  1
M 1M !

x
1
M
: (75)
To this end, substituting (75) into (38) and utilizing [39, Eq.
(3.351.3)], the asymptotic secrecy outage probability result for
the ZF/MRC scheme is derived as (41) after some simple
manipulations.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Assuming m = min (1; 2m), the asymptotic CDF of m
in high SNR is given by
Fm (x) 
1
M !

1 +
1
M

x
1
M
: (76)
Furthermore, note that MRTBMRC  AB + m, hence, by
invoking [44, Propositions 4 and 5], the asymptotic CDF of
MRTBMRC is given by
FMRTBMRC
(x)  1
 (M + 1)!

1 +
1
M

x
1
M+1
(77)
On the other hand, when 1 !1, the instantaneous SNR
of the eavesdropper’s channel under the MRT/MRC scheme
can be approximated as
MRTEMRC  AE + 3: (78)
Considering that both AE and 3 are the exponential RV, thus,
the CDF of MRTEMRC is expressed as
fMRTEMRC
(x) 
8<:
3
3 4

e 
x
3   e  x4

; 3 6= 4
x
24
e 
x
4 ; 3 = 4
(79)
To this end, substituting (77) and (79) into (38) and utilizing
[39, Eq. (3.351.3)], the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
result for the MRC/MRT scheme can be obtained as (49) after
some simple manipulations.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
To avoid confusion, we first define X = Ps2 jhAEj2 and
Y = Pr2
?hRE2F in (57). According to [42], the PDF of
Y is given by
fY (y) =
yM 2
  (M   1) M 13
e 
y
3 : (80)
Then, by utilizing order statistic, the CDF of ECJ is
expressed as
FECJ (z) = Pr

X
Y + 1
< z

=
Z 1
0
FX (z (y + 1)) fY (y) dy
= 1  1
M 13
e 
z
4

1
3
+
z
4
 (M 1)
; (81)
where we have used [39, Eq. (3.351.3)] to solve the corre-
sponding integral. Thus, taking derivative of (81), the PDF of
ECJ can be derived as (61).
13
REFERENCES
[1] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no.
6, pp. 2515-2534, June 2008.
[2] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst.
Tech. J., vol. 28, pp. 656-715, Oct. 1949.
[3] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp.
1355-1387, 1975.
[4] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no.4, pp. 451-456, July 1978.
[5] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: Cooperation
for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 4005-4019,
Sep. 2008.
[6] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas-
part II: The MIMOME wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
56, no. 11, pp. 5515-5532, Nov. 2010.
[7] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
“Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement in MIMO wiretap
channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 144-154, Jan. 2013.
[8] N. Yang, H. A. Suraweera, I. B. Collings, and C. Yuen, “Physical
layer security of TAS/MRC with antenna correlation,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 254-259, Jan. 2013.
[9] M. Z. I. Sarkar and T. Ratnarajah, “Enhancing security in correlated
channel with maximal ratio combining diversity,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 6745-6751, Dec. 2012.
[10] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, R. Schober, and R. K. Mallik, “Secure
transmission with antenna selection in MIMO Nakagami-m channels,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 6054-6067, Nov.
2014.
[11] J. Zhang, C. Yuen, C.-K. Wen, S. Jin, and X. Gao, “Ergodic secrecy
sum-rate for multiuser downlink transmission via regularized channel
inversion: Large system analysis,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 18, no. 9,
pp. 1627-1630, Sep. 2014.
[12] J. Zhu, R. Schober, and V. K. Bhargava, “Secure transmission in
multicell massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol.
13, no. 9, pp. 4766-4781, Sep. 2014.
[13] J. Zhu, R. Schober, and V. K. Bhargava, “Linear precoding of data and
artificial noise in secure massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 2245-2261, Mar. 2016.
[14] S. Leng, D. W. K. Ng, and R. Schober, “Power efficient and secure
multiuser communication systems with wireless information and power
transfer,” in IEEE International Conference on Communications Work-
shops (ICC), 2014, pp. 800-806.
[15] J. Zhang, C. Yuen, C.-K. Wen, S. Jin, K.-K. Wong, and H. Zhu, “Large
system secrecy rate analysis for SWIPT MIMO wiretap channels,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 74-85, Jan. 2016.
[16] X. Chen, C. Zhong, C. Yuen, and H.-H. Chen, “Multi-antenna relay
aided wireless physical layer security,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53,
no. 12, pp. 40-46, Dec. 2015.
[17] H. Deng, H.-M. Wang, W. Guo, and W. Wang, “Secrecy transmission
with a helper: To relay or to jam,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 293-307, Feb. 2015.
[18] H.-M. Wang, M. Luo, Q. Yin, and X.-G. Xia, “Hybrid cooperative
beamforming and jamming for physical-layer security of two-way relay
networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 2007-
2020, Dec. 2013.
[19] C. Wang, H.-M. Wang, and X.-G. Xia, “Hybrid opportunistic relaying
and jamming with power allocation for secure cooperative networks,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 589-605, Feb. 2015.
[20] I. Krikidis, J. S. Thompson, and S. McLaughlin, “Relay selection
for secure cooperative networks with jamming,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 5003-5011, Oct. 2009.
[21] J. Huang and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Cooperative jamming for secure
communications in MIMO relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871-4884, Oct. 2011.
[22] X. Chen, L. Lei, H. Zhang, and C. Yuen, “Large-scale MIMO relaying
techniques for physical layer security: AF or DF?,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 5135-5146, Sep. 2015.
[23] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875-1888, Mar. 2010.
[24] J. Li, A. P. Petropulu, and S. Weber, “On cooperative relaying schemes
for wireless physical layer security,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol.
59, no. 10, pp. 4985-4997, Oct. 2011.
[25] V. N. Q. Bao, N. L. Trung, and M. Debbah, “Relay selection schemes for
dual-hop networks under security constraints with multiple eavesdrop-
pers,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 12, pp. 6076-6085,
Dec. 2013.
[26] L. Fan, X. Lei, T. Q. Duong, M. Elkashlan, and G. K. Karagiannidis,
“Secure multiuser communications in multiple amplify-and-forward
relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 62, no. 9, pp. 3299-3310,
Sep. 2014.
[27] S.-I. Kim, I.-M. Kim, and J. Heo, “Secure transmission for multiuser
relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 7, pp.
3724-3737, July 2015.
[28] H.-M. Wang, F. Liu, and M. Yang, “Joint cooperative beamforming,
jamming and power allocation to secure AF relay systems,” IEEE Trans.
Veh. Technol., vol. 64, no. 10, pp. 4893-4898, Oct. 2015.
[29] F. S. Al-Qahtani, C. Zhong, and H. Alnuweiri, “Opportunistic relay
selection for secrecy enhancement in cooperative networks,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 1756-1770, May 2015.
[30] L. Tong, B. Sadler, and M. Dong, “Pilot-assisted wireless transmissions:
General model, design criteria, and signal processing,” IEEE Signal
Process. Mag., vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 12-25, Nov. 2004.
[31] A. Khisti, A. Tchamkerten, and G. W. Wornell, “Secure broadcasting
over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2453-
2469, June 2008.
[32] Y. Zou, X. Wang, and W. Shen, “Optimal relay selection for physical
layer security in cooperative wireless networks,” IEEE J. Select. Areas
Commun., vol. 31, no. 10. pp. 2099-2111, Oct. 2013.
[33] L. Wang, K. J. Kim, T. Q. Duong, M. Elkashlan, and H. V. Poor,
“Security enhancement of cooperative single carrier systems,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 90-103, Jan. 2015.
[34] A. Basilevsky, Applied Matrix Algebra in the Statistical Sciences. New
York: North-Holland, 1983.
[35] G. Zhu, C. Zhong, H. Suraweera, Z. Zhang, and C. Yuen, “Outage
probability of dual-hop multiple antenna AF systems with linear process-
ing in the presence of co-channel interference,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 2308–2321, Apr. 2014.
[36] P. Anghel and M. Kaveh, “Exact symbol error probability of a cooper-
ative network in a Rayleigh-fading environment,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 1416-1421, Sep. 2004.
[37] C. Zhong, H. Suraweera, A. Huang, Z. Zhang, and C. Yuen, “Outage
probability of dual-hop multiple antenna AF relaying systems with
interference,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 108-119, Jan.
2013.
[38] Y. Huang, F. Al-Qahtani, C. Zhong, Q. Wu, J. Wang, and H. Alnuweiri,
“Performance analysis of multiuser multiple antenna relaying networks
with co-channel interference and feedback delay,” IEEE Trans. Com-
mun., vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 59-73, Jan. 2014.
[39] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, 7th ed. Academic Press, 2007.
[40] J. Pe´rez, J. Iba´nez, L. Vielva, and I. Santamaria, “Closed-form approx-
imation for the outage capacity of orthogonal STBC,” IEEE Commun.
Lett., vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 961-963, Nov. 2005.
[41] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180-2189, June 2008.
[42] Z. Ding, K. K. Leung, D. L. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “On the
application of cooperative transmission to secrecy communications,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 359-368, Feb. 2012.
[43] A. P. Prudnikov, Y. A. Brychkov, and O. I. Marichev, Integrals and
Series. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1992, vol. 5, Inverse Laplace
Transforms.
[44] Z. Wang and G. B. Giannakis, “A simple and general parameterization
quantifying performance in fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 1389-1398, Aug. 2003.
14
Yuzhen Huang (S’12-M’16) received his B.S. de-
gree in Communications Engineering, and Ph.D.
degree in Communications and Information Systems
from College of Communications Engineering, PLA
University of Science and Technology, in 2008 and
2013 respectively. He has been with College of
Communications Engineering, PLA University of
Science and Technology since 2013, and currently as
an Assistant Professor. His research interests focus
on channel coding, MIMO communications systems,
cooperative communications, physical layer security,
and cognitive radio systems. He has published nearly 30 research papers in
international journals and conferences such as IEEE TCOM, IEEE TVT,
IEEE CL, WCNC, etc. He and his coauthors have been awarded a Best
Paper Award at the WCSP 2013. He received an IEEE COMMUNICATIONS
LETTERS exemplary reviewer certificate for 2014.
Jinlong Wang (SM’13) received the B.S. degree
in mobile communications, M.S. degree and Ph.D.
degree in communications engineering and infor-
mation systems from Institute of Communications
Engineering, Nanjing, China, in 1983, 1986 and
1992, respectively. Since 1979, Dr. Wang has been
with the Institute of Communications Engineering,
PLA University of Science and Technology, where
he is currently a Full Professor and the Head of
Institute of Communications Engineering. He has
published over 100 papers in refereed mainstream
journals and reputed international conferences and has been granted over
20 patents in his research areas. His current research interests are the
broad area of digital communications systems with emphasis on cooperative
communication, adaptive modulation, multiple-input-multiple-output systems,
soft defined radio, cognitive radio, green wireless communications, and game
theory.
Dr. Wang also has served as the Founding Chair and Publication Chair of
International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing
(WCSP) 2009, a member of the Steering Committees of WCSP2010-2012, a
TPC member for several international conferences and a reviewer for many
famous journals. He currently is the vice-chair of the IEEE Communications
Society Nanjing Chapter and is an IEEE Senior Member.
Caijun Zhong (S’07-M’10-SM’14) received the
B.S. degree in information engineering from Xi’an
Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China, in 2004, and the
M.S. degree in information security and the Ph.D.
degree in telecommunications from the University
College London, London, U.K., in 2006 and 2010,
respectively. From September 2009 to September
2011, he was a Research Fellow with the Institute
for Electronics, Communications and Information
Technologies (ECIT), Queen’s University Belfast,
Belfast, U.K. Since September 2011, he has been
with Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, where he is currently an Associate
Professor. His research interests include massive MIMO systems, full-duplex
communications, wireless power transfer, and physical layer security. He is
an Editor for the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS,
the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, EURASIP JOURNAL OF WIRELESS
COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING, and JOURNAL OF COMMUNICA-
TIONS AND NETWORKS. He was an Exemplary Reviewer for the IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS in 2014. He and his coauthors have
been awarded a Best Paper Award at the WCSP 2013. He was the recipient of
the 2013 IEEE ComSoc Asia-Pacific Outstanding Young Researcher Award.
Trung Q. Duong (S’05-M’12-SM’13) received his
Ph.D. degree in Telecommunications Systems from
Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH), Sweden in
2012. Since 2013, he has joined Queen’s University
Belfast, UK as a Lecturer (Assistant Professor). His
current research interests include physical layer se-
curity, energy-harvesting communications, cognitive
relay networks. He is the author or co-author of 190
technical papers published in scientific journals and
presented at international conferences.
Dr. Duong currently serves as an Editor for the
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, IEEE COMMUNICATIONS
LETTERS, IET COMMUNICATIONS, WILEY TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, and ELECTRONICS LETTERS. He
has also served as the Guest Editor of the special issue on some major
journals including IEEE JOURNAL IN SELECTED AREAS ON COMMUNI-
CATIONS, IET COMMUNICATIONS, IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
MAGAZINE, IEEE COMMUNICATIONS MAGAZINE, EURASIP JOURNAL
ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING, EURASIP JOUR-
NAL ON ADVANCES SIGNAL PROCESSING. He was awarded the Best Paper
Award at the IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Spring) in 2013,
IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 2014. He is the
recipient of prestigious Royal Academy of Engineering Research Fellowship
(2015-2020).
George K. Karagiannidis (M’96-SM’03-F’14) was
born in Pithagorion, Samos Island, Greece. He re-
ceived the University Diploma (5 years) and PhD
degree, both in electrical and computer engineering
from the University of Patras, in 1987 and 1999,
respectively. From 2000 to 2004, he was a Se-
nior Researcher at the Institute for Space Applica-
tions and Remote Sensing, National Observatory of
Athens, Greece. In June 2004, he joined the fac-
ulty of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
where he is currently Professor in the Electrical
& Computer Engineering Dept. and Director of Digital Telecommunica-
tions Systems and Networks Laboratory. He is also Honorary Professor at
South West Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China. His research interests are
in the broad area of Digital Communications Systems with emphasis on
Wireless Communications, Optical Wireless Communications, Wireless Power
Transfer and Applications, Molecular Communications, Communications and
Robotics and Wireless Security. He is the author or co-author of more
than 400 technical papers published in scientific journals and presented at
international conferences. He is also author of the Greek edition of a book
on “Telecommunications Systems” and co-author of the book “Advanced
Optical Wireless Communications Systems”, Cambridge Publications, 2012.
Dr. Karagiannidis has been involved as General Chair, Technical Program
Chair and member of Technical Program Committees in several IEEE and
non-IEEE conferences. In the past he was Editor in IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
COMMUNICATIONS, Senior Editor of IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS,
Editor of the EURASIP JOURNAL OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND
NETWORKS and several times Guest Editor in IEEE JOURNAL IN SELECTED
AREAS ON COMMUNICATIONS. From 2012 to 2015 he was the Editor-in
Chief of IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS. Dr. Karagiannidis has been
selected as a 2015 Thomson Reuters Highly Cited Researcher and he Listed
in Thomson Reuters 2015 World’s Most Influential Scientific Minds.
